Equality, along with liberty, has long been a cornerstone of democracy and liberal culture, more generally. And although we have not reached what could be called full equality, we find ourselves amid a serious backlash, where the fundamental equality of individuals is being denied or questioned in troubling ways.
In his new book, Basic Equality, Paul Sagar, senior lecturer in political theory at King's College in London, offers an insightful and compelling vision of how we should think about equality as a value.
Sagar begins by picking up on what philosopher Ronald Dworkin called the "egalitarian problem"—that is, that there's a wide and strong consensus that individuals are inherently equal, though no one can convincingly explain why that is. Equality is one of our "deepest normative assumptions," he writes, even though there are not good arguments for believing it (2). The purpose of the book is to make a case for why basic equality should be accepted.
Sagar offers a quick survey of foundational thinkers in the tradition of political philosophy to demonstrate how recent and novel equality is as a social principle. Aristotle went so far as to defend slavery, Jean-Jacques Rousseau saw women as second-class citizens, and even Thomas Hobbes, who was one of the first to talk about equality in a serious way, did so only for survival purposes. John Locke went the furthest in his call for equality but did so from a theistic perspective. More to the point, Sagar also finds all of the current secular attempts as insufficient, despite many strong and serious efforts.
"The trouble is," Sagar writes, "that as soon as one asks for an explanation for this foundational premise, it begins to look very shaky" (1). Humans are, after all, unequal in many obvious and sometimes important ways. Bodies and abilities vary, of course, but so too do we vary in our ability to reason, regulate our temperament, and relate to others. This is especially true with those with mental disabilities, children, and the aged.
It's the job of philosophers, as Sagar sees it, to offer arguments relating to the truth of equality, while social scientists and historians can address the issue of why we have come to believe it and what it looks like in practice. It's a standard division of labor, he describes, but it's also misguided and has not been terribly fruitful. Instead, he wants to blend the disciplines and do his thinking in a more social and historical context.
Sagar lands on the claim that "we are basic equals because of the complex ways in which we have come to treat each other in our recent history" (175). In other words, equality has more to do with the integrity of our actions than what has been proven as true. This definition, he explains, is based on the belief of human essences, while not exactly iron clad are strong enough to support the notion that humans ought to be treated equally.
The essential dignity of all humans has a home in many variants of Christian theology, but his conclusion will likely be unconvincing to those demanding a firmer foundation on which to rest such an important principle. Although Sagar mentions Friedrich Nietzsche a few times and only in the endnotes, his project seems informed in part by Nietzsche's warning against taking truth as a value. Nietzsche was no egalitarian, but Sagar wants to emphasize the use-value of equality and leave it at that.
Sagar warns against a "hyperintellectualist theory that is accessible only to those with extensive technical philosophic training" (13), which he mostly accomplishes. Indeed, a defense doesn't have to be understood by people without philosophic training. "Whatever basic equality consists in, it has to be something that ordinary people can have gotten a grasp on," he explains (13-14). In this, the reasons for the faith and the faith itself might be distinct.
Sagar brackets economic inequality in a way that many readers will find unsatisfying. His definition "does tell us on what grounds we are forbidden from imposing inequalities on each other" (172), but it stops short of requiring economic equality, even though he recognizes the danger that severe inequalities can bring. As Sagar explains, "Any conception of basic equality that took a definite and prescriptive stance about what follows from basic equality in terms of economic and social distributions would thus also itself be controversial" (171). That such a move might be necessary doesn't make it any less disappointing.
Moreover, Sagar pays insufficient attention to recent challenges to political liberalism in the United States and elsewhere. Basic equality has "come to be widely accepted as the only permissible outlook" (11), even if the denial of equality still lingers in some places. Women in the Muslim world, for instance, are often face challenges rooted in outdated laws and practices related to ownership, marriage, genital mutilation, education, healthcare, employment, and wages, even though these restrictions contradict the letter and spirit of Islamic teachings on women’s rights. Sagar avoids discussing them at length due to his own lack of knowledge, he admits. Still, he sees his idea about basic equality as one that can be adopted by these cultures in time, even though they could appear dissimilar in practice.
Sagar also acknowledges there are some Nietzschean types, and also types such as the "overconfident bigot" who are inclined to prefer a hierarchical social order, with the expectation that they would be at or near the top. To that, Sagar asks, "are you sure?" (201).
Indeed, if equality is not a demonstrably true but something closer to a cultural norm that we inherit and practice, then the fact that a large (and perhaps increasing) minority of certain countries are calling into question equality as a political value (not just a philosophic fact), then the entire house of cards is at risk of collapsing, either through electoral means or in the future as next generations become less and less socialized to appreciate the inherent goodness of equality.
Consider the ways in which Donald Trump and his followers use dehumanizing language when referring to immigrants and the transgender community. Were he to return to office, it would likely become worse and perhaps sanctioned by law. Even if Trump were not reelected, this sentiment is unlikely to go away any time soon, and there’s nothing in Sagar’s view to protect equality as he understands it from going extinct. As he readily admits, "If we collectively stop viewing and treating each other as basic equals, then we will stop being basic equals” (175). This is hardly satisfying.
In any event, to meet the moment, progressives and philosophers might want to stop looking for a way to ground equality and start doing what they can do spread the narrative with confidence, or we could easily find ourselves in a society where, to invoke Orwell, everyone is basically equal but some people are "just more equal than others."
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